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Abstract
Mixed traffic networks containing both traditional information and communications
technology (ICT) network traffic and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
network traffic are more commonplace now due to the desire for remote control and
monitoring of industrial processes. The ability to identify SCADA devices on a mixed
traffic network with zero prior knowledge, such as port, protocol or IP address, is desirable
since SCADA devices are communicating over corporate networks but typically use
non-standard ports and proprietary protocols.
Inspired by previous research success of machine learning (ML) in accurately
classifying various protocols in Internet traffic, this research uses the following four
supervised ML algorithms to identify SCADA network traffic within a mixed traffic trace:
Naı̈ve Bayes, NBTree, J4.8, and BayesNet. Using packet timing, packet size and data
throughput as traffic behavior categories, this research calculates 24 attributes from each
device dataflow within a mixed traffic trace and introduces a novel approach of using these
attributes to identify SCADA network traffic, achieving at least a .99 true positive
rate (TPR). This research goes further by utilizing two attribute reduction functions to
identify an optimal attribute subset, while maintaining the desired TPR of .99 for SCADA
network traffic.
The attributes and ML algorithms chosen for experimentation successfully
demonstrate that a TPR of .9935 for SCADA network traffic is feasible on a given
network. This research also successfully identifies an optimal attribute subset, while
maintaining the .99 TPR. The optimal attribute subset identified in this research provides
the SCADA network traffic behaviors that most effectively differentiating them from
traditional ICT network traffic.
iv
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BEHAVIORAL PROFILING OF SCADA NETWORK TRAFFIC USING MACHINE
LEARNING ALGORITHMS
I. Introduction
Internet Protocol (IP) traffic classification techniques typically rely on deep packet
inspection (DPI) methods to interpret the contents of a packet’s payload [37, 56]. These
techniques are limited, however, for applications that use non-standard port numbers or
payload encryption [37]. As an alternative to traditional classification approaches,
machine learning (ML) algorithms (e.g., Naı̈ve Bayes) have successfully used statistical
network traffic attributes to classify Internet application traffic with greater than 99%
accuracy [37]. This research uses four supervised ML algorithms to investigate the
classification of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) network traffic within
a mixed network traffic trace with a desired true positive rate (TPR) of at least .99. This
chapter introduces the problem, research goals and approach, as well as the assumptions
and limitations of the research.
1.1 Problem Overview
It is now common for SCADA network traffic to be integrated into corporate Local
Area Networks (LANs) creating mixed networks containing both SCADA and traditional
information and communications technology (ICT) traffic [1]. Corporations in the process
industry (e.g., electrical, water treatment, and manufacturing) are assigning IP addresses
to SCADA devices to provide remote control for technicians and monitoring capabilities
for usage reports and billing information; consequently, these devices may now be
accessible from the Internet.
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A 2012 Project SHINE [7] report showed that researchers have identified over
1,000,000 unique IP addresses of SCADA associated devices connected to the Internet.
Many times the SCADA device owners are unaware that their devices are connected to the
Internet [42, 48]. Other times, default configurations are set to check for software updates
via the Internet. The need for situational awareness techniques for identifying SCADA
devices on mixed traffic networks is increasingly important [11, 48]. Traditional methods
of device identification that utilize port number, protocol, and IP address are useful;
however, non-traditional methods such as using flow-based statistics are necessary when
this information is insufficient or unavailable.
Previous research has demonstrated the ability to classify traditional ICT network
traffic using statistical traffic attributes [2, 9, 31]. The research has aided in the creation of
anomaly-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs), which use behavioral traffic patterns
and protocol signatures to detect network traffic anomalies [9]. Little research has been
done, however, specifically using behavioral analysis to characterize SCADA network
traffic thus far. The ability to identify SCADA network traffic on a mixed traffic network
without prior knowledge of protocol, port, or IP address is necessary as SCADA devices
tend to use proprietary protocols and non-standard ports [48].
Twenty-four statistical flow-based attributes are calculated from each dataflow (i.e.,
device-to-device communication) in the mixed network traffic trace containing both
SCADA and traditional ICT device dataflows. The 24 attributes are characterized by three
categories of traffic behavior: packet timing, packet size, and data throughput. The
categories are selected based on the known attributes of many SCADA protocols which
are: deterministic, hierarchical and consistent due to their polling nature [1, 2]. The
categories and attributes selected are expected to differentiate SCADA network traffic
from traditional ICT network traffic.
2
This research also aims to identify an optimal subset of attributes from the full 24
flow-based attribute set that identify SCADA network traffic with a minimal decrease in
TPR. Determining an optimal set of SCADA network traffic attributes can help create a
network traffic classification device specifically designed for SCADA networks, as well as
assist with the identification of typical SCADA device dataflow characteristics.
1.2 Research Goals
This research proposes that supervised ML algorithms will successfully identify
SCADA network traffic within a mixed traffic trace containing dataflows from both
SCADA and traditional ICT devices. There are two main goals for this research. The first
goal is to identify SCADA network traffic within a mixed network traffic trace using
flow-based attributes based on packet timing, packet size and data throughput with a
desired TPR of at least .99. The second goal is to identify an optimal subset of attributes
while maintaining at least a .99 TPR for SCADA network traffic classification.
1.3 Approach
The mixed traffic dataset used in this research is formed using traffic collected from a
real-world oil and gas company network, a water and waste water treatment facility
network, and a traditional ICT network. Four supervised ML algorithms: Naı̈ve Bayes,
Naı̈ve Bayes Tree (NBTree), Bayesian Network (BayesNet), and J4.8 Decision Tree, are
evaluated using the TPR and false positive rate (FPR) over three different attribute subsets.
Classification model build time and dataset classification time are also examined to
determine implementation feasibility in a real-world traffic classification device.
The Weka ML toolkit, used in this research, is an open source application that
provides a collection of ML algorithms and tools for data pre-processing, classification,
regression, clustering, association and visualization [19]. Weka contains two attribute
reduction functions, the wrapper function and the filter function, to use with classification
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algorithms. The wrapper function is used to identify an optimal attribute subset from the
full attribute set, with minimal loss of classification accuracy, depending on the
classification algorithm used [44]. The filter function is used to rank all attributes in the
full attribute set from most to least effective for classifying a dataset [45].
1.4 Assumptions and Limitations
In this research two assumptions are made about the collected network traces. The
first assumption is that each 24-hour trace collected represents the network activity of a
typical day for the SCADA and traditional ICT networks. The second assumption is that
the SCADA and ICT networks used to collect the traces represent typical networks of
their respective type (i.e., the ICT network used in this research possesses network traffic
behavior common to most ICT networks).
There are two limitation of the research. The first is that a real-world mixed traffic
network, containing both SCADA and traditional ICT traffic, was unavailable to obtain a
traffic trace from. The experimental dataset is created by combining dataflows from traffic
collected on real-world SCADA and traditional ICT networks to create a mixed network
traffic trace. The second limitation is that both SCADA networks, where the traces were
collected, use the Modbus protocol, therefore, Modbus is the only SCADA protocol in the
final dataset. Due to the research limitations, the experimental results may not extend to
different SCADA protocols or networks.
1.5 Thesis Overview
Chapter 2 describes a typical SCADA network, current threats to SCADA devices,
the basics of network traffic analysis and behavior characterization and ML techniques
used in solving classification problems. Chapter 3 details the experimental setup, dataset
collection and creation methods, and performance metrics of the ML algorithms. Chapter
4
4 presents the results and analysis of the experiments. Chapter 5 provides conclusions of
the research and suggests areas of future work.
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II. Background
This chapter presents an overview, background information and related research.
Section 2.1 provides basic information about SCADA systems. Section 2.2 discusses
security threats to SCADA systems. Section 2.3 examines the current approaches to
network traffic analysis and examines previous research performed to characterize traffic
behavior for both SCADA and traditional ICT networks. Section 2.4 describes ML and
supervised-learning algorithms.
2.1 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) System Overview
SCADA systems control and monitor processes for water distribution, oil and natural
gas pipelines, electrical utility transmission and distribution, and other systems that
provide a critical public service [48]. SCADA systems are comprised of three levels: a
management level, a communication transport level, and a field level. Figure 2.1 shows an
overview of the three basic levels of a SCADA system.
Figure 2.1: SCADA System Levels [48].
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The management level is the system control center containing the Human Machine
Interface (HMI), data historian server, and engineering workstations, which are all
connected by a LAN [48]. SCADA system operators use the HMI to remotely control and
monitor field device operations [6]. System operators also handle centralized system
alarms, trend analyses, and reporting from the field devices at the management level [48].
The field level consists of one or more field sites containing field devices, such as
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), that control
the local process actuators and monitoring sensors [48]. The management and field levels
are connected via the communication transport level. The communication transport level
is the Wide Area Network (WAN) providing remote access capability to operators in the
control center. Field device information is transported between the control center and field
sites using a variety of communication techniques found at various SCADA facilities such
as telephone line, cable, fiber, or radio frequency.
SCADA and traditional ICT networks serve different purposes; therefore, have
unique hardware and software characteristics that set them apart. Typical hardware on a
SCADA network includes a Master Terminal Unit (MTU) in the control center,
communication equipment such as a radio or cable, and field sites consisting of PLCs and
RTUs to control local processes [48]. PLCs and RTUs are embedded devices configured
to perform specific process tasks and generally handle a range of inputs and outputs
generated by the local process sensors and actuators. Furthermore, SCADA networks have
limited user interaction compared to ICT networks.
SCADA network communication is typically hierarchical in nature where a master
device polls many field devices to obtain status information (e.g., temperature reading) or
to send control commands (e.g., close a valve) [6]. Traditional ICT networks, however, are
peer-to-peer (P2P) in nature and do not have strict timing requirements that necessitate
device polling.
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SCADA networks exhibit more consistent behavior in both topology and periodicity
of packets sent between devices [6]. End devices are not added or removed as often in
SCADA networks as in traditional ICT networks, creating a more static topology. Polling
intervals of SCADA master devices exhibit periodical behavior for packets sent between
devices, unlike traditional ICT networks where human interaction affects sent packet
intervals.
Application protocols associated with traditional ICT networks typically use standard
public communications protocols such as HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP), File
Transfer Protocol (FTP), and Server Message Block (SMB). However, many protocols
used on SCADA systems are proprietary [48]. SCADA protocols tend to be deterministic
in nature such that given an input the device output is predictable [1, 2]. Standard ICT
application protocols can be non-deterministic, in that they are required to handle various
user-generated inputs and provide multiple outputs based on those inputs.
Utilizing SCADA systems to automate large or distributed industrial processes has
many benefits including a reduction in operational costs, maintenance and overall
safety [48]. A corporation creates a mixed traffic network when they connect SCADA
systems by assigning the devices an IP address on their traditional corporate LANs. There
are many reasons corporations connect their SCADA devices to their corporate LAN,
namely, to provide remote control and monitoring for technicians and engineers, to collect
production and usage data for billing purposes and to report energy usage for government
green efficiency efforts. Many times the SCADA device owners are unaware that their
devices are connected to the Internet [42, 48].
Default configurations on devices are often set to check for software updates via the
Internet. Indeed, as mixed traffic networks in the corporate environment become more
common, the ability to distinguish between SCADA device traffic and traditional ICT
device traffic is increasingly important [11, 48]. Figure 2.2 provides an example mixed
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traffic network configuration. In the figure, the SCADA network is accessible via the
corporate LAN and separated from the Internet by two firewalls.
Figure 2.2: Mixed Traffic Network Configuration [17].
2.2 Threats to SCADA Systems
2.2.1 Previous SCADA Attacks.
Threats to SCADA systems can be intentional, unintentional, targeted or
non-targeted, and can come from a variety of sources [41]. Shodan is a search engine for
Internet connected devices. It has been referred to as “Google for Hackers” due to the ease
in which it identifies attack targets, including Internet-connected SCADA devices [35].
According to ICS-CERT [22], “Hackers are using the Shodan computer search engine to
find Internet-facing ICS systems” which represent potentially insecure mechanisms for
authentication and authorization.
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An example of a hacker penetrating network security at a Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
water filtering facility occurred in October 2006 [14]. Operating over the Internet, the
attacker compromised an employee’s laptop and used its remote access to the facility’s
SCADA system to install a virus and spyware. The attack was discovered before damage
occurred, however, if successful, the compromised SCADA system could have been used
to distribute emails and pirated software.
In August 2006, an insider attack on a SCADA system occured when two Los
Angeles city employees hacked into the system that controlled the city’s traffic lights [41].
They disrupted the traffic signals at four intersections causing backups and delays. The
attack was launched prior to an anticipated labor protest by city employees [21].
A recent cyber intrusion against a critical system was reported in May 2013 when
U.S. intelligence agencies traced an intrusion into the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
National Inventory of Dams (NID) to a suspicious IP address [16]. The database
contained sensitive information on vulnerabilities of the 8,100 major dams across the
U.S.[10]. The NID included information such as the number of people that would be
killed if a dam were to fail. During the attack, an unauthorized user gained access to the
sensitive information without the proper clearance. The unauthorized access was revoked
once discovered; however, the user had access to the NID for about three months.
In 2010, Stuxnet, a well known industrial control system (ICS) attack, targeted PLCs
controlling ICS processes in a nuclear facility [15]. The worm injected code into the PLC
that altered the system’s motor speed, causing damage to the components. Stuxnet
propagated to a closed ICS network using a removable media device. It successfully hid
its malicious activities, destroyed the ICS components and demonstrated the capability of
achieving significant physical effects using a highly targeted attack.
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2.2.2 SCADA System Attack Techniques.
SCADA systems are becoming less isolated and more vulnerable to security threats.
According to a National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recently published
Guide to ICS Security, SCADA technology is advancing by integrating traditional ICT
system solutions like IP-based communications and standard computers [48]. The
cyber-physical nature of SCADA devices make them a target for malicious attack since
their compromise can lead to human safety issues, environmental issues, and critical
service outages.
According to the Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency Response
Team (ICS-CERT) Monthly Monitor newsletter [21], in the first half of the fiscal year
2013, ICS-CERT responded to over 200 cyber incidents across all of the 16 Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) identified critical infrastructure sectors. Of these, 53% were in
the energy sector. The incident responses represent a variety of threats ranging from
advanced persistent threats (APTs) to sophisticated and common malware found in the
SCADA environment. Other incidents in the water and commercial ICS sectors involved
Internet-facing systems with weak or default credentials. The attack techniques used in the
majority of incidents were: Watering hole, SQL injection, and Spear phishing attacks. All
three attack techniques utilized the Internet to gain access to a connected SCADA system.
Watering hole attacks follow four main steps [50]. First, an attacker profiles a victim
and learns the type of websites the person frequently visits. Next, the attacker tests all of
the websites for security vulnerabilities. When the attacker finds a vulnerable website,
they inject JavaScript or HTML code to redirect visitors to a new website hosting
malicious code. Lastly, the compromised website waits for a victim to visit and infect
them with zero-day exploits, similar to a lion waiting at a watering hole.
SQL stands for structured language query and is the primary programming language
used to manage data within a database [38]. Database queries performed over the Internet
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primarily use SQL to access a server’s database to grant system access, obtain product or
account information or access data. According to the Open Web Application Security
Project (OWASP), a SQL injection is a type of attack where a maliciously structured SQL
query is inserted as the input data from the client side to the application database. A
successful attack can access sensitive data from a backend database, modify existing data
within the database and execute administrative commands on the database by allowing the
attacker to spoof their identity.
Phishing is a type of cyber attack using fraudulent emails to trick victims into giving
an attacker personal or financial information [51]. The emails appear to be from a
legitimate website where a user may have an account such as PayPal or BestBuy.
Spear-phishing is a more targeted version of phishing where the email appears to come
from an individual or business the individual may know. While phishing attacks are more
general and usually sent out as spam to as many victims as possible, spear-phishing is
specifically directed and tailored to an individual. This type of attack uses personalization
tactics such as using the victim’s first name or a recent online purchase to gain trust,
tricking them into providing sensitive information such as account numbers, passwords or
financial information.
2.2.3 Mitigation Efforts and Recommendations.
2.2.3.1 Organizational Efforts.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a government organization
charged with securing the nation from threats [55]. DHS’s Office of Infrastructure
Protection works with public and private sector critical infrastructure partners and leads a
coordinated national effort to mitigate risks to the nation’s critical infrastructure through
the development and implementation of a protection program. The Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) [53] and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP) [54] provide the overarching framework for a partnership between the government
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and private sectors for the protection of critical infrastructure [55]. These documents serve
to establish national policy in order to identify, prioritize and protect the nation’s critical
infrastructure.
The ICS-CERT is also part of DHS and coordinates with other organizations to
reduce risks within and across all critical infrastructure sectors by partnering with law
enforcement, intelligence agencies and federal, public and private control system owners,
operators and vendors [22]. They collaborate with international and private sector Cyber
Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) to share ICS-related security incidents and
mitigation measures. They publish alerts, advisories and quarterly newsletters to keep the
ICS community informed of newly discovered vulnerabilities and also provide teams of
cyber attack experts as incident responders for federal, public and private ICS owners and
operators.
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) is a not-for-profit
entity whose mission is to ensure the reliability of Bulk-Power Systems in North America
and provide assurance to the public, private and government for the reliable performance
of electric systems [36]. The NERC’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee (CIPC)
was formed to advance the physical and cyber security of the critical electricity
infrastructure of North America. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation
Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee (NERC CIPC) works closely with
organizations responsible for cyber security in all electric industry segments and the
government. They assist in the development of critical infrastructure protection standards
and conduct forums and workshops for educating those involved in the protection of
critical infrastructure and prevention of cyber attack incidents [36].
2.2.3.2 Recommendations.
The President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board within the Department of
Energy has published 21 best practices for securing SCADA systems [11]. The first three
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recommendations are to identify all connections to the SCADA network, disconnect
unnecessary connections to the SCADA network, and strengthen the security of all
necessary connections to the SCADA network. These three recommendations highlight
the need for situational awareness of all connections to a SCADA network (e.g., internal
LAN, WAN, the Internet, business partners, vendors or regulatory agencies) as a first step
in securing the network. Other recommendations identify the need for system isolation
such as removing unnecessary network services, implementing internal and external IDS
systems, and conducting physical security surveys of remote sites.
Eliminating possible backdoor entry into a SCADA network can be a daunting task
for mixed traffic networks which include both SCADA and traditional ICT devices.
Despite security organization recommendations to establish situational awareness and
isolation of SCADA networks, there is a steady increase in SCADA devices connected to
the Internet. Project SHINE (SHodan INtelligence Extraction) is a project developed to
extract information about the existence of SCADA and ICS devices accessible from the
Internet [7]. Project SHINE uses Shodan to look for device service banners to determine
device types such as computers, printers, switches, PLCs, RTUs, and anything else with
an IP address. Project SHINE has been collecting data since mid-April 2012 and reports
that the average number of new SCADA associated devices found every day is typically
between 2000 and 8000. To date they have collected over 1,000,000 unique IP addresses
that appear to belong to traditional SCADA devices such as PLCs, RTUs, and HMI
servers, and non-traditional SCADA devices such as Heating, Ventilation, and Air
Conditioning (HVAC) or environmental control systems, traffic light control systems, and
medical devices. Many times the SCADA system owner is unaware that their devices are
connected to the Internet, highlighting the need for SCADA device identification [42, 48].
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2.3 Network Traffic Analysis and Behavior Characterization
2.3.1 Introduction.
Traffic analysis of transport layer applications, such as Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packet inspection, is an essential part
of an effective network defense strategy. Common analysis tools such as IDS applications,
Wireshark, and Tcpdump, provide various means to view, analyze, and compare traffic to
known malicious signatures and anomalies. These capabilities provide situational
awareness of network activity and possible early detection of attacks.
Cheung et al. use model-based techniques for analyzing SCADA network traffic.
They describe model-based approaches as more feasible for detecting new, unknown
dataflows on SCADA networks than traditional ICT networks since SCADA networks
tend to have a static topology, regular traffic patterns, and a limited number of protocols
and applications [9]. In their research, they utilize the open-source signature-based IDS,
Snort, and specify misuse and attack rules, based on device endpoints (e.g., IP addresses
and port numbers) and other packet attributes (e.g., keywords in the packet payload). They
develop models to characterize the expected behavior based on Modbus\TCP specification
and create Snort rules to detect the complement of their models.
While the approach of using the Snort IDS to detect network traffic violations was
successful, there are limitations. One limitation is that the customized rules required to
use Snort as a model-based IDS necessitate hand-coded, protocol-specific rules [9].
Another limitation is when the communication protocols are unknown, such as when a
proprietary SCADA device is added to a network, the protocol-specific rules could miss
an intrusion violation.
It is also typical for traditional ICT network devices to communicate using known or
assigned port numbers and public-domain protocols such as HTTP, Post Office Protocol
3 (POP3), or Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). However, with SCADA devices, the
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ports and protocols used can be non-standard and propriety, making them difficult to
identify when analyzing traffic [1, 37]. A large corporate network contains numerous
interconnected devices, which can include SCADA devices, running various applications
and protocols that communicate over the same infrastructure. As end devices are added
and removed from a network, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain full situational
awareness of every device connected at a given time.
2.3.2 Methods for Analyzing Network Traffic.
In-depth analysis of network traffic is critical for network defense. Tools for analysis
come in the form of hardware containing specialized software or software installed
directly onto a host computer. A variety of free network traffic analysis software is
available such as Wireshark [58] and Tcpdump [52], as well as commercially available
tools. These tools collect dataflows traversing a selected network interface and decode the
data packets of known protocols, displaying them in human-readable format [58]. Most
traffic analysis tools perform a combination of both shallow packet inspection (SPI) and
DPI on packets of known protocols. In SPI, the tool only inspects the header portion of a
packet to include source and destination port number, source and destination IP address,
and transport layer protocol, such as TCP or UDP [8]. SPI does not look at the packet’s
application layer protocol or payload.
Some protocols are associated with known ports such as HTTP on port 80, HTTPS
on port 443, and SMTP on port 25. A web or email server is readily identified by port
number using SPI. In other cases, the knowledge of the port number or protocol for a
device is not available. As a result, SPI is not enough to identify a device or dataflow. DPI
can assist in the identification process by examining the entire packet, including
application protocol and payload content [8]. Traffic analysis tools that perform DPI must
decode the application’s protocol in order to display the payload content. This can be an
issue with proprietary protocols, such as those used in many SCADA devices, as the
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protocol specifics are likely unknown. The information obtained using SPI and DPI is
helpful in most cases, but is not enough to identify all devices or dataflows on a network.
2.3.3 Previous Traffic Analysis Research.
Significant research has been accomplished in traditional ICT network traffic
behavior characterization. According to Moore et al. [34], timing attributes can be used to
differentiate between dataflows during analysis. For HTTP “80% of HTTP requests occur
within three seconds of each other and 95% occurs within a minute and a half” [4]. If an
HTTP dataflow does not follow this pattern, it is considered abnormal since HTTP traffic
occurs in short bursts as pages load, with timing gaps while the end nodes receive the data.
Such known behavior can be used to identify an HTTP dataflow with reasonable accuracy,
even if there is no other identifying information.
SCADA device traffic differs from traditional ICT device traffic. SCADA networks
are typically static, both in terms of network topology and tasks performed [9]. Servers
and hardware are not frequently added to a SCADA system once it is operational and it
typically only has one purpose: running the field devices and ensuring the proper
operation of critical processes. SCADA networks are also regimented in how data from
remote hosts and commands are distributed throughout the network. Packets in a SCADA
network are typically generated in a polling fashion where a master requests information
from a number of slave devices. However, there are instances where the slave devices
initiate dataflows to notify the master of an issue. Furthermore, SCADA protocols
generally lack authentication and encryption due to operating requirements and use of
antiquated devices.
The number of services or protocols on a SCADA network are usually limited;
however, it is now commonplace for SCADA device traffic to connect to traditional ICT
networks, which contain common services (protocols) (e.g., HTTP, VoIP and instant
messaging) [1].
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Barbosa et al. [1] note that previous research shows a self-similar nature of
traditional ICT network traffic. The presence of long-range dependencies and heavy-tailed
distributions of packets has lead to traffic models and tools for optimizing network design
and management. In their research, they set out to verify if the traffic models used to
describe traditional network traffic can be applied to SCADA device traffic. They
introduce a number of ways to compare network behavior from the attributes of
self-similarity, topological properties and application specific aspects. In their research
they used four SCADA network traces and an ICT network trace from an educational
organization. They test the following four attributes present in both traces for similarity:
• Diurnal Patterns of Activity: Network activity which correlates with human
activity (e.g., work and lunch).
• Self-Similarity: The network trace as a whole resembles parts of itself (e.g.,
burstiness patterns).
• Log-normal Connection Sizes: When typical connection size of a trace is plotted,
its curvature is log-normal.
• Heavy-tailed Distribution: File sizes, transfer times and burst length, when
plotted, show heavy or long-tailed distribution in their curves.
The results show that SCADA network traffic does not display the diurnal patterns of
activity present in regular ICT dataflows. SCADA traffic has a time series that remains
stable over large periods of time, whereas regular ICT traffic has lower throughput during
the evenings and weekends and peak throughput during regular business hours, in
particular at the start of the day and during lunch hours. The self-similarity analysis
performed using packets per second and bytes per second time series showed that the ICT
traffic presented self-similar behavior, while the SCADA datasets indicate a
non-self-similar behavior.
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When observing the behavior of dataflow size, the ICT datasets illustrated both
heavy-tailed for packets per flow and log-normal distribution for flow duration; however,
the SCADA datasets were not always conclusive - one dataset had a tail distribution
similar to heavy-tailed while others were skewed in a variety of ways [1]. This implies
that different SCADA networks do not display similar file sizes, transfer times or burst
lengths, which traditional ICT networks share a commonality when plotted. They used
real-world SCADA traffic traces to perform their research and concluded that network
traffic models used to describe traditional ICT network traffic cannot be applied to
SCADA network traffic [1].
In related research, using the relatively static nature of SCADA topoplogy, Mahmood
et al. [31] perform flow-based network traffic analysis on SCADA networks by observing
significant changes in the number of dataflows present on the network to detect anomalies.
They also capitalize on the fact that SCADA data packets are typically generated in a
polling fashion where a master device polls a number of slave devices for data [31].
Having only knowledge of the number of device dataflows present during normal
operations and flow rate patterns among the devices on the network they are able to
successfully detect probing attacks, malware propagation, rogue master or slave devices
and flooding-based denial-of-service attacks.
While this approach was successful on a SCADA network, it does not translate to a
mixed-traffic network containing both SCADA and traditional ICT devices. A
mixed-traffic network is less static than a SCADA network due to devices being added and
removed on a regular basis as well as having less predictable packet timing characteristics.
Traditional ICT devices do not generate packets in a periodically consistent manner like
master devices polling slave devices in a SCADA network because their packet timing is
influenced by human activity and much less predictable.
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2.4 Machine Learning (ML)
Most network traffic analysis techniques rely on the 5-tuple packet information of
source and destination IP address, source and destination port number, and application
protocol (e.g., [9]). While this method works well for applications that use known
protocols and ports, it has limitations for SCADA devices that may use proprietary
protocols and unknown ports. ML offers an alternative to traffic classification with a
number of algorithms demonstrating a high accuracy (i.e., up to 99%) for a wide range of
Internet application traffic [37]. This section describes ML and how it can be used to
classify network traffic using flow-based statistical attributes of a dataflow, rather than
information found within the packet.
2.4.1 Types of ML Techniques.
ML is historically defined as a collection of powerful techniques or algorithms for
data mining and knowledge discovery which search for useful patterns in data [37].
Internet traffic classification approaches apply ML techniques to recognize statistical
patterns in observable attributes of network traffic such as flow duration, packet size, and
inter-packet arrival time to determine the source of a dataflow [37]. Previous ML traffic
classification research demonstrates the ability to observe distinctive dataflow attributes
for a number of TCP applications [10, 12, 26, 27, 40].
ML is implemented into facial recognition software [18], spam detection
software [39], and assists financial institutions with credit card fraud detection [32]
without the need for human interaction. Stuart et al. [49] outline the three main types of
ML: supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement.
In supervised ML algorithms, a classification model is generated which maps inputs
to outputs [49]. Figure 2.3 provides a visual representation of the supervised learning
process. Data classification using supervised ML is a two-step process [20]. The first step
is the learning or training phase, where the algorithm is provided a training dataset
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containing labeled data samples with attributes. The labels are the classes in which each
data sample belongs. The knowledge gained during the training phase can be presented as
a flowchart, decision tree, rule set, or other model that is later used to classify new
unlabeled data samples [37]. The second step is the testing phase, which utilizes the
model built during the training phase to perform classification on a new unlabeled
dataset [37], labeling each sample with the predicted class to which it belongs. A number
of supervised learning algorithms exist, each differing in the way their classification
model is constructed and what search algorithms they use.
Unsupervised ML algorithms, also referred to as association learning, perform
classification in two phases as well; however, the training component is given no hints
about the structure of the data inputs (e.g., the labels in supervised learning) [49]. The
training phase builds a classification model based on patterns or associations it detects
between the samples in the given dataset. Clustering is the most common unsupervised
learning technique. Clustering algorithms naturally discover groups using internalized
heuristics and focus on finding patterns in the given dataset [37]. Hierarchical and Simple
K-means are two examples of clustering algorithms [60].
Reinforcement ML is most prevalent in the artificial intelligence community.
Reinforcement learning creates intelligent agents through a system of rewards and
punishments without specifying how the task will be accomplished [24]. This learning
model typically consists of a discrete set of environment states, a discrete set of agent
actions and a set of reinforcement signals, typically 0 or 1 [24]. The intelligent agent’s
goal is to gain the largest sum of reinforcement signals (i.e., rewards), which it acquires
after choosing an action with a reward attached [24].
2.4.2 Supervised ML Algorithms.
A number of supervised ML algorithms exist for data classification, each differing in
the way they construct the final classification model. Four supervised ML algorithms are
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Figure 2.3: The Supervised Learning Process.
selected for this research due to their success in previous traffic classification
research [33, 37, 57].
Naı̈ve Bayes. The Naı̈ve Bayes algorithm is a statistical classifier based on the
Bayesian theorem [20]. This algorithm analyzes the relationship between the attributes
and class label for each data sample in a given dataset to derive a conditional probability
for the association between attribute value and class [57]. Naı̈ve Bayes classifiers estimate
the probabilities of an attribute having a certain value to predict class membership for each
data sample. The classifiers assume that the effect of an attribute value on a given class is
independent of the values of the other attributes [20].
Moore et al. [33], performed Internet traffic classification using Naı̈ve Bayes. The
research distinguished between 10 classes of Internet traffic using six discriminating
attributes derived from packet header information. The 10 network traffic classes which
included multiple applications per class were labeled: bulk, database, interactive, mail,
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services, www, P2P, attack, games, and multimedia. The 6 discriminators used to derive
attributes for the ML algorithms were: flow duration, TCP port, packet inter-arrival time
statistics, payload size statistics, effective bandwidth, and Fourier Transform of the packet
inter-arrival time. They achieved a 65% accuracy on per-flow classification when using a
simple Naı̈ve Bayes estimator; however, using two refinement techniques on the
algorithm, they achieved 95% accuracy [33].
J4.8 decision tree. The J4.8 algorithm is an open source Java implementation of the
C4.5 algorithm found in the Weka ML toolkit [60]. Decision tree algorithms use a
divide-and-conquer method to classify samples [60]. Figure 2.4 provides an example of a
basic decision tree for classifying a fruit with the three structures found in decision
trees–nodes, branches and leaves. The nodes in the tree are color, size, and taste, which
represent the attributes of a class of fruit with the branches of the tree (e.g., red, green and
small) representing the possible values of each attribute. A leaf represents a class label and
terminates a series of nodes and branches (i.e., the decisions made by the algorithm) [57].
Determining the class of a sample within a given dataset is a matter of tracing the path of
nodes and branches to the terminating leaf [57]. The path for determining a lime class in
the decision tree depicted by Figure 2.4 is: if and only if its color is green, its size is small
and its taste is sour. Different decision tree algorithms use varying techniques during the
training phase to create the final decision tree model used for classification [43].
Barto [3] compared the following five ML algorithms for accuracy when classifying
16 distinct web services within encrypted Transport Layer Protocol (TLS) dataflows:
Naı̈ve Bayes, NBTree, LibSVM, J4.8 and AdaBoost+J4.8. The number of packets
necessary to accurately identify a web service class is also analyzed. In the research, J4.8
and AdaBoost+J4.8 produced the highest accuracies and runtimes. J4.8 reached a peak
accuracy of 97.99% using the first 14 packets of a dataflow. AdaBoost+J4.8 demonstrated
a peak accuracy of 98.41% when the first 18 packets of a dataflow are used. The accuracy
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Figure 2.4: Sample Decision Tree.
and runtime results demonstrated the suitability of J4.8 and AdaBoost+J4.8 for real-world
detection devices.
Naı̈ve Bayes Tree (NBTree). The NBTree algorithm is a hybrid of a Naı̈ve Bayes
classifier and a decision tree classifier, designed to accurately classify increasingly large
datasets efficiently [57]. The classification model created during the training phase is
described as a decision tree consisting of nodes and branches with Naı̈ve Bayes classifiers
on the leaves [20]. Given a node representing an attribute, the algorithm evaluates the
utility of a split to create a branch from that node [57]. If there are no splits that provide a
significantly better utility, a Naı̈ve Bayes classifier is created and the current node
becomes a terminating leaf. NBTree is found to have higher classification accuracy than
C4.5 or Naı̈ve Bayes for a majority of the tested datasets [57].
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Williams et al. [57] evaluate the accuracy and computational performance speed of
five supervised ML algorithms, namely, Naı̈ve Bayes (discretisation and kernel density
estimation), C4.5 Decision Tree, BayesNet, and NBTree for the classification of six
application classes found on a traditional ICT network trace. The six application classes
they chose were: FTP-Data, Telnet, SMTP, DNS, HTTP, and Half-Life. They found that
the classification accuracy was similar for all five algorithms of at least 95% for six
application traffic flows. Nguyen et al. [37] found similar results when comparing NBTree
with four other supervised ML algorithms for the classification of various IP applications:
ftp control, smtp, pop3, imap, https, http and ssh. While all five algorithms demonstrated a
high accuracy of up to 99%, NBTree’s computational performance speed was significantly
slower than the other algorithms when using the full attribute list.
Bayesian Network (BayesNet). The BayesNet algorithm is structured as a
combination of a directed acyclic graph of nodes and links, and a set of conditional
probability tables [5]. Nodes represent the sample attributes, while links between nodes
represent the relationship between the attributes. Conditional probability tables determine
the strength of each link [57]. Each node (attribute) has one probability table that defines
the probability distribution for each attribute given its parent nodes. If a node has no
parents, the probability distribution is unconditional. If it has one or more parent, the
probability distribution depends on the values of the parents. BayesNet algorithms use a
two-step process to perform classification. The first stage is the learning phase, where
local score metrics based on the Bayesian theorem form the initial network structure. The
second stage uses an estimation algorithm to create the conditional probability tables. The
estimator uses the dataset to calculate class membership probabilities for each sample, as
well as the conditional probabilities of each node given its parent nodes in the network
structure created in the first stage [57].
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Williams et al. [57] evaluated BayesNet along with four other supervised ML
algorithms, namely Naı̈ve Bayes (discretisation and kernel density estimation), C4.5
Decision Tree, and NBTree for their ability to classify 10 different network traffic classes.
They found that given the same features and flow trace, BayesNet provided similar results
compared to the other four algorithms all demonstrating at least 95% classification
accuracy.
2.4.3 Attribute Reduction Functions.
Previous research has demonstrated the success of using attribute reduction functions
for finding optimal attribute subsets while minimizing the loss of classification
accuracy [37, 57]. Supervised ML algorithms are provided with a dataset containing data
samples. Each sample consists of a list of attribute values and a class assignment used by
the training model to gain information about each class and build the classification model.
This research uses 24 flow-based attributes calculated from each dataflow to classify
SCADA and ICT device dataflows. Previous research has shown that when training a ML
classifier, using all available attributes is not always the optimal option because irrelevant
or redundant features can negatively impact the algorithm’s accuracy and runtime
performance [57]. Finding an optimal subset of attributes that maintain or increase the
classification accuracy and improve classification time is useful for implementation in
real-world traffic classification devices.
The Weka ML toolkit is an open-source data mining application that provides a
collection of machine learning algorithms and tools for data preprocessing, classification,
regression, clustering, association and visualization [19]. Weka provides two attribute
reduction functions that use different methods to find an optimal subset of attributes with
minimal loss of classification accuracy. The two attribute reduction functions are the filter
function and the wrapper function.
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The filter function uses an attribute evaluator and a ranking algorithm to evaluate and
rank each attribute in the full attribute set [45]. For example, in this research there are 24
flow-based attributes in the full attribute set; therefore, the filter function assigns each
attribute a rank from 1 to 24 based on effectiveness when performing classification. The
filter function does not consider the algorithm when ranking the attributes. As such, the
same optimal attribute subset is obtained for all four algorithms.
The wrapper function also uses an attribute evaluator to evaluate the performance of
all possible attribute subsets using a specified ML algorithm. The wrapper function
produces an optimal attribute subset tailored to each algorithm [57]. As such, the wrapper
function is run with all four algorithms to obtain an optimal attribute subset unique to each
algorithm.
2.4.4 Previous ML Traffic Classification Research.
Previous ML traffic classification research demonstrates the ability to observe
distinctive dataflow attributes such as flow duration, byte profiling, packet inter-arrival
time, packet size and the distribution of such attributes for a number of TCP applications
[10, 12, 26, 27, 40]. Williams et al. [57] evaluated five supervised ML algorithms for both
accuracy and computational performance: Naı̈ve Bayes (NBD, NBK), C4.5, Bayesian
Network and Naı̈ve Bayes Tree. They used publicly available network traces containing
millions of dataflows from a variety of applications [57]. They initially defined 22
payload-independent flow attributes to use for training the algorithms; however, using
attribute set reduction methods, they found an optimal subset of 9 flow attributes with
minimal loss of classification accuracy [57].
Using 10-fold cross-validation to create testing and training sets, they found that with
the exception of one algorithm (i.e., Naı̈ve Bayes kernel density estimation) all of the ML
algorithms had similar levels of accuracy [57]. The full 22 attribute set had an average of
94.13% classification accuracy and the 9 attribute subset had an average of 93.14%
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classification accuracy; however, the computational performance (i.e., training and model
build time) improved significantly in 4 out of the 5 algorithms, when using the reduced
attribute subset. C4.5 decision tree was the only algorithm that showed no performance
speed improvement when using the reduced subset; however, its performance speed was
faster than the other four algorithms with both attribute sets [57].
They concluded that when training a ML classifier, using the maximum number of
attributes is not always the optimal option and may negatively impact the performance of
the algorithm [57]. They also found that the C4.5 ML algorithm had the highest
classification accuracy rate and computationally outperformed the other four algorithms
with the least training and model build time, even when using the full 22 attribute set. The
other four algorithms were all Naı̈ve Bayes-based and, except for the kernel density
estimation, had similar classification accuracy and computational performance results
with the 22 attribute set and 9 attribute subset, although some had a greater performance
increase than others when using the reduced subset.
Li et al. [29] used support vector machines (SVM) ML algorithms to train seven
classes of applications. They used traffic traces obtained from a campus network
backbone and developed a discriminator selection algorithm to find an optimal attribute
set for the training phase. Using the optimal attribute subset, their SVM classifier obtained
96.9% accuracy for un-biased (i.e., uniform prior probability) training and testing samples
and 99.4% accuracy for biased (i.e., non-uniform prior probability) [29]. Their optimal
attribute subset contained 9 attributes, all of which are achievable in real time from
captured packet headers, making ML algorithm implementation feasible for real time
traffic classification.
Erman et al. [13] used the unsupervised ML approach, namely clustering, to
demonstrate how cluster analysis can be used to effectively identify groups of Internet
traffic that are similar, using only transport layer statistics. They perform experiments
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using two unsupervised clustering algorithms, K-Means and DBSCAN, to perform
network traffic classification [13]. The traces used as input samples to their algorithms
come from a publicly available trace from the University of Auckland and a trace
collected from the University of Calgary’s Internet connection. The results show that both
K-Means and DBSCAN work well for Internet traffic classification. K-Means performed
with 85% accuracy, while DBSCAN had a 75% classification accuracy rate. Although
DBSCAN has a lower overall accuracy, the clusters it forms are more accurate than
K-Means, allowing the identification of a significant portion of the trace’s connections.
The classification and clustering ML approaches have been the focus of many
Internet traffic classification research projects, using only transport layer statistics;
however, very little SCADA traffic classification research has been accomplished. Indeed,
SCADA network traffic is not generally a class or group that previous research attempts to
identify. Therefore, the focus of this research is to use supervised ML algorithms to
identify SCADA dataflows within a mixed network traffic trace, independent of packet
payload data and to find the optimal subset of flow-based attributes to represent typical
SCADA network traffic behavior.
2.5 Summary
This chapter presents background information to understand the research and
contributions described in the following chapters. The need for SCADA network traffic
behavioral characterization is provided, followed by the current approaches to network
analysis and traffic classification. ML algorithms are also discussed with a focus on Naı̈ve
Bayes and decision tree supervised learning algorithms, due to their prevalence in this
research.
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III. Methodology
This chapter describes the methodology for testing four supervised ML algorithms on
their ability to identify SCADA network traffic within a mixed network traffic trace as well
as identifying an optimal subset of attributes for SCADA network traffic identification.
3.1 Problem Definition
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis.
The two main goals of this research are to demonstrate that SCADA network traffic
can be accurately identified within a mixed network traffic trace and to identify an optimal
subset of attributes with minimal loss of classification accuracy. An algorithm is
considered effective if it obtains a TPR of at least .99 for SCADA network traffic and an
FPR of < .05, the misclassification rate of ICT dataflows as SCADA. The TPR and FPR
are both used as measures of effectiveness because it is important to accurately identify
SCADA dataflows while at the same time not misclassifying ICT dataflows as SCADA.
Supervised ML algorithms have successfully demonstrated accuracies greater than 99%
when classifying Internet application traffic [3, 37]; therefore, achieving a TPR of at least
.99 for SCADA network traffic identification within a mixed network traffic trace is
desirable.
This research explores an optimal subset of attributes from the full 24 flow-based
attribute set while maintaining the desired .99 TPR. Utilizing two attribute reduction
functions built into the Weka ML toolkit, the filter and wrapper functions, the accuracy of
each algorithm is determined for each attribute reduction function subset.
The amount of time each algorithm takes to build its classification model during the
training phase and to classify the dataset during the testing phase are also evaluated.
While build and classification timing are not the focus of this work, it is beneficial to note
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them as performance metrics for future work. Indeed, faster classification model build
time and dataset classification time will be crucial when implementing ML algorithms in
near-real-time network traffic classification tools.
It is expected that given proper training on the unique attributes of SCADA traffic, a
supervised ML algorithm will successfully identify SCADA network traffic, obtaining a
TPR of at least .99. This classification accuracy provides the ability to identify critical
devices communicating on mixed traffic networks. It is expected that an optimal subset of
attributes found using the wrapper and filter functions in the Weka ML toolkit will yield a
higher TPR lower model build and dataset classification times for all four ML algorithms
tested.
3.1.2 Approach.
The first strategic goal of this research is to demonstrate that SCADA network traffic
can be identified within a mixed traffic trace, obtaining at least a .99 TPR, using 24
flow-based attributes calculated from each dataflow. The first goal provides the ability to
successfully identify SCADA devices communicating on mixed traffic network containing
both SCADA and traditional ICT network traffic. The second strategic goal is to identify
an optimal subset of attributes, while maintaining the .99 TPR for SCADA network traffic
identification. By identifying an optimal subset of attributes that successfully distinguish
SCADA dataflows from traditional ICT dataflows, SCADA traffic characteristics can be
determined within a mixed traffic network. In addition, measuring the effectiveness of the
ML algorithms for accurately classifying each dataflow as either SCADA or ICT increases
the ability to identify SCADA devices communicating over a mixed traffic network.
The experiments in this research utilize real-world network traces collected from two
different SCADA networks and one traditional ICT network to determine the unique
flow-based attributes of each class (i.e., SCADA or ICT). The 24 flow-based attributes
calculated from each SCADA and traditional ICT dataflow are used during the training
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phase to build the ML algorithm’s classification model. The model is then used by the ML
algorithm’s classifier component during the testing phase to classify new dataflows. The
ML algorithm’s classifier component is provided a dataset containing known, but
unlabeled SCADA and ICT dataflows; therefore, the algorithm’s effectiveness can be
directly measured using the TPR and FPR.
3.2 System Boundaries
The system under test (SUT) is the Dataflow Classification System (DCS) shown in
Figure 3.1. There are two components in the DCS. The first component is the ML
framework which consists of the Weka ML toolkit version 3.6.10, an open-source data
mining application that contains machine learning algorithms and tools for data
pre-processing, classification, regression, clustering, association and visualization [19].
The second component is the host computer, a Dell Precision Workstation T7500 with
23.5 GB of memory and a 2.00 GHz x 8 processor. The host computer is running the
Ubuntu 13.04 operating system. The two components of the ML framework are the ML
trainer, which creates the algorithm’s classification model, and the ML classifier, which
classifies unlabeled dataflows as either SCADA or ICT using the classification model
created by the trainer.
The components under test (CUT) are the ML algorithm’s trainer and classifier.
Since the ML algorithm’s classifier is dependent upon the classification model built by the
ML trainer component, both components are tested. During the training phase,
hand-classified (labeled) real-world ICT and SCADA dataflows are provided to the SUT’s
trainer component in order to generate the classification model used in the testing phase.
During the testing phase, the SUT’s classifier component is provided a dataset with
unclassified dataflows and the classification model. It uses the classification model to label
each dataflow as belonging to either the SCADA class or the ICT class.
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The mixed traffic dataflows are provided to each component as an Attribute-Relation
File Format (ARFF) file. The ARFF file format stores each dataflow as a list of attributes
and a class label, one dataflow instance per line. When the ARFF file is used for the
training phase, each dataflow instance contains the list of attribute values and a class label.
However, when the ARFF file is used for testing, each dataflow instance only contains the
list of attribute values with no class label.
There are three categories of network traffic behavior that this research hypothesizes
will differentiate SCADA and ICT network traffic: packet timing, packet size, and data
throughput. The 24 flow-based attributes calculated from each dataflow are categorized
into one of the three traffic behavior categories. The class labeled and unlabeled ARFF
files are the workload for the SUT.
The SCADA and ICT dataflows used to train and test the DCS are collected from
real-world networks. Obtaining real-world SCADA traffic is challenging due to the
sensitivity of these critical systems; therefore, only two unique SCADA network traces
have been obtained to use with the DCS. Although the operating characteristics may vary
among different SCADA networks, the research demonstrates the ability to accurately
identify SCADA network traffic within mixed traffic networks utilizing dataflows from
two disparate SCADA networks.
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Figure 3.1: Dataflow Classification System.
3.3 Workload
The workload for the DCS consists of the labeled SCADA and ICT device dataflows
provided to the ML trainer and the unlabeled dataflows provided to the ML classifier. The
mixed traffic datasets used in this research are created using traffic collected from two
real-world SCADA networks and one real-world ICT network to ensure accurate
classification of each dataflow type.
3.3.1 Network Traffic Collection.
The two SCADA network traces collected for this research are from a real-world
water and waste water treatment facility network and an oil and gas company network.
The traditional ICT trace was collected from a real-world research network at the Air
Force Institute of Technology. Supervised ML algorithms require reasonably sized
datasets when performing classification [59]. Therefore, the water and waste water
treatment facility trace and the traditional ICT network trace are captured in 1-hour
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increments over a 24-hour period during a regular business day (i.e., Monday-Friday),
creating 24 consecutive 1-hour traces for each network. The oil and gas company network
trace is small enough to be captured as one 24-hour trace.
This research makes two assumptions about the collected traces. The first assumption
is that each 24-hour trace captures the network activity of a typical day for the SCADA
and traditional ICT networks. The second assumption is that the SCADA and ICT
networks represent typical networks of their respective type (i.e., the ICT and SCADA
networks used in this research possess network traffic behaviors consistent with their
respective network types). The facilities that allowed the SCADA network traffic
collection will remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of their network information.
3.3.2 Data Preprocessing.
3.3.2.1 Dataflow Classification.
When performing network traffic classification using supervised ML algorithms, a
necessary step in dataset preprocessing is to hand-classify each dataflow provided to the
training component. In this research, each dataflow must be hand-classified as either
SCADA or ICT depending on the device from which the flow originates.
The following network management protocols are present in both the SCADA and
traditional ICT network traffic traces: Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP),
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), and Address Resolution Protocol (ARP). The
focus of this research is to identify SCADA network traffic from a mixed traffic network
trace; therefore, the network management protocols are removed from the traces before
using them in the final mixed traffic dataset. All protocols except the Modbus protocol are
filtered out of the SCADA network traces, since this is the SCADA protocol used by the
two networks. This ensures that only the SCADA dataflows are hand-classified and no
other protocols are misclassified. Similarly, all protocols except the TCP protocol are
filtered out of the ICT network traffic trace. TCP is used to transport most application
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traffic such as Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), HTTP, HyperText
Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS), POP3, SMTP, and Modbus. Consequently, it is
verified that no Modbus dataflows are present in the ICT traces and only ICT protocols
(i.e., non-network management protocols) are hand-classified as ICT dataflows.
3.3.2.2 Mixed Traffic Dataset Creation.
Although the traffic traces from the traditional ICT network and water and waste
water facility network were collected in one hour increments many of the files are
significant in size. For example, the 1-hour ICT network trace between 1400 to 1500
hours contains 104,121 TCP dataflows and has a file size of 106.3 GB. Due to the
requirement for reasonably sized datasets in the ML experiments, only 4 of the 1-hour
traces are used in the final dataset. The 4 traces were selected by analyzing characteristics
for each of the network’s 24 1-hour traces.
The 24 1-hour SCADA files each contained between 400 - 500 Modbus dataflows
and the file sizes were all approximately 500 MB regardless of the time of day collected.
Given the consistent traffic activity and file size among the 24 1-hour files, four files are
selected in increments of approximately 6-hours apart for use in the final mixed traffic
dataset. Evenly incremented files are selected in order to capture any variation over the
24-hour period.
The 24 1-hour ICT files revealed that the network traffic was strongly influenced by
human activity. Between the hours of 1700 - 0800, the 1-hour traces contained between
15,000 to 30,000 TCP dataflows with file sizes between 1 GB to 2.5 GB. The number of
TCP dataflows and file sizes of the 1-hour traces increased significantly during the typical
business hours of 0800 to 1700. During that time, the number of TCP dataflows ranged
between 32,000 to 108,000 and the file sizes between 2.5 GB to 106.3 GB. Given the
inconsistency in number of dataflows and file size, four 1-hour traces are chosen which
capture the various traffic activity occurring over the 24-hour period. The number of TCP
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dataflows found in the four selected ICT traces are: 43,742; 12,763; 26,599 and 31,687,
capturing the various activity patterns over the 24-hour period while maintaining a
manageable size for the final mixed traffic dataset.
The final mixed traffic dataset is created by combining the dataflows from the four
1-hour water and waste water treatment facility network traces, the 24-hour trace from the
oil and gas company network, and the four 1-hour ICT network traces. The final mixed
traffic dataset used in this research contains 1,736 SCADA device dataflows and 114,791
ICT device dataflows for a total of 116,527 mixed traffic dataflows. Table 3.1 shows an
overview of the trace names and number of dataflows used in this research.
Table 3.1: Overview of the Datasets.
Description Number of Dataflows
Oil and Gas Company Network (24 hours) 3
Water & Waste Water Treatment Facility (1 hour: 2200-2300) 405
Water & Waste Water Treatment Facility (1 hour: 0500-0600) 488
Waste Water Treatment Facility (1 hour: 1000-1100) 448
Water & Waste Water Treatment Facility (1 hour: 2000-2100) 392
Traditional ICT Network (1 hour: 1500-1600) 43742
Traditional ICT Network (1 hour: 0300-0400) 12763
Traditional ICT Network (1 hour: 1000-1100) 26599
Traditional ICT Network (1 hour: 1200-1300) 31687
Final Mixed Traffic Dataset 116527
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3.3.2.3 Network Traffic Attributes.
The final step in dataset preprocessing is to create the ARFF file provided to the ML
training and testing components. An ARFF file consists of three sections: the filename,
also referred to as the relation, the attributes, and the data samples. Each of the 116,527
mixed traffic dataflows from the final dataset is a data sample in the ARFF file. Each data
sample contains a list of the attribute values and the class assignment for each dataflow.
To calculate the attribute values for each dataflow, the nine network traces selected to
create the final dataset are split into individual dataflow stream files. For example, the
1-hour ICT network trace between 1200 to 1300 hours contains 31,687 dataflows. Once
split, there are 31,686 separate .pcap files, each containing only one TCP dataflow stream.
Since there is a total of 116,527 dataflows in the nine selected traces, the attribute values
are calculated on 116,527 individual .pcap files and added as one line per dataflow to the
ARFF file for use in the experiments.
The research selected 24 flow-based attributes for SCADA dataflow classification.
SCADA networks have known attributes that are expected to differentiate their traffic
behavior from traditional ICT network traffic. Due to their polling nature, most protocols
found on SCADA networks typically have the following characteristics [1, 2]:
• Deterministic: In SCADA networks, the operation of a device should be
predictable. When a device is given an input a deterministic output is expected since
the critical processes are dependent on predictability.
• Hierarchical: Devices communicate in a one-to-many fashion. In a SCADA
network, a master device polls many field devices for operational information.
• Consistent: SCADA master devices poll field devices in set time intervals. The
periodicity of packets sent between these devices occurs in steady intervals rather
than traditional ICT devices, such as email servers, where human interaction affects
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sent packet timing. Furthermore, the topology of SCADA networks tends to remain
more static than traditional ICT networks because nodes are not added or removed
as often.
Three categories of network traffic behavior are selected based on prior knowledge of
typical SCADA protocol behavior: packet timing, packet size, and data throughput. The
24 flow-based statistics, which become the 24 attributes for the ML algorithms, are shown
in Table 3.2. Attributes 1 to 8 relate to packet timing, attributes 9 to 16 relate to packet
size, and attibutes 17 to 24 relate to data throughput. The selected attributes require basic
arithmetic functions for calculations, making their speed of calculation desirable for
implementation in near-real-time devices. The 24 attributes are calculated from each
dataflow stream without the need to determine ports, protocol, IP addresses, or payload
content; only flow-based information such as packet inter-arrival time and size are
required. In addition to the 24 attributes, each dataflow is given a label based on its class
membership. This research uses two labels: SCADA or ICT. The goal of the DCS is to
correctly classify unlabeled dataflows from a mixed traffic trace as belonging to either the
SCADA or ICT class.
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Table 3.2: Full Attribute Set.
Number Category Name Description
1 Timing min iat ab Minimum inter-packet arrival time (src to dest)
2 Timing max iat ab Maximum inter-packet arrival time (src to dest)
3 Timing mean iat ab Mean inter-packet arrival time (src to dest)
4 Timing var iat ab Variance of inter-packet arrival time (src to dest)
5 Timing min iat ba Minimum inter-packet arrival time (dest to src)
6 Timing max iat ba Maximum inter-packet arrival time (dest to src)
7 Timing mean iat ba Mean inter-packet arrival time (dest to src)
8 Timing var iat ba Variance of inter-packet arrival time (dest to src)
9 Size min efb ab Minimum Ethernet frame byte size (src to dest)
10 Size max efb ab Maximum Ethernet frame byte size (src to dest)
11 Size mean efb ab Mean Ethernet frame byte size (src to dest)
12 Size var efb ab Variance of Ethernet frame byte size (src to dest)
13 Size min efb ba Minimum Ethernet frame byte size (dest to src)
14 Size max efb ba Maximum Ethernet frame byte size (dest to src)
15 Size mean efb ba Mean Ethernet frame byte size (dest to src)
16 Size var efb ba Variance of Ethernet frame byte size (dest to src)
17 Throughput min bps ab Minimum bits per second (src to dest)
18 Throughput max bps ab Maximum bits per second (src to dest)
19 Throughput mean bps ab Mean bits per second (src to dest)
20 Throughput var bps ab Variance of bits per second (src to dest)
21 Throughput min bps ba Minimum bits per second (dest to src)
22 Throughput max bps ba Maximum bits per second (dest to src)
23 Throughput mean bps ba Mean bits per second (dest to src)
24 Throughput var bps ba Variance of bits per second (dest to src)
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3.4 Performance Metrics
The DCS provides a binary classification service because it only considers two labels
or classes: SCADA and ICT. Accuracy is often used to measure the performance of a
classifier, and is sometimes the only evaluation criteria given in ML research [30]. The
total accuracy of a classifier is defined as the number of correct predictions it makes over
the total number of predictions made [23].
Reporting the number of True positives (TPs), True negatives (TNs), False
positives (FPs), and False negatives (FNs) and their associated rates provides a
representation of a binary classifier’s performance [47]. Based on Japkowicz et al. [23],
the following definitions are used for this research:
• TP = The number of SCADA dataflow instances correctly classified as SCADA.
• FP = The number of ICT dataflow instances incorrectly classified as SCADA.
• TN = The number of ICT dataflow instances correctly classified as ICT.
• FN = The number of SCADA dataflow instances incorrectly classified as ICT.
The first goal is to demonstrate a TPR of at least .99 for identifying SCADA network
traffic, therefore the effectiveness of each ML algorithm is measured using the number of
TPs and FPs and their associated rates. The TPR is calculated using Equation 3.1 and the
FPR is calculated using Equation 3.2. A ML algorithm is considered effective if it
achieves a TPR of at least .99 and a FPR of < .05. The TPR and FPR are both used as
measures of effectiveness because it is important to accurately identify SCADA dataflows
while at the same time minimizing the misclassification of ICT dataflows as SCADA.
Note that the false negative rate (FNR) is 1 - TPR and, as such, is implicitly included in
the TPR results. The true negative rate (TNR) can be found using the equation TNR = 1 -
FPR.
41
T PR =
TP
TP + FN
(3.1)
FPR =
FP
FP + TN
(3.2)
The time each algorithm takes to build the classification model and to classify the
dataset are also used as performance metrics for each experiment to aid in deciding which
algorithm to implement in a near-real-time classification device.
3.5 Factors
Two factors are selected for testing and evaluation in this research as shown in Table
3.3.
Table 3.3: Factors and Levels.
Factors Levels
ML Algorithm Naı̈ve Bayes, NBTree, BayesNet, J4.8 Decision Tree
Attribute Set Full Attribute Set, Wrapper Attribute Subset, Filter Attribute Subset
3.5.1 ML Algorithms.
Four ML algorithms are chosen for the experiments: Naı̈ve Bayes, NBTree,
BayesNet, and J4.8 Decision Tree. All four are supervised-learning algorithms; therefore,
they take training datasets with labeled dataflows from both SCADA and ICT network
traffic and create a classification model based on the given dataset. The ML classifier
component uses the classification model created by the trainer to classify the instances of
a given unlabeled dataset. The model makes a determination based on information gained
during the training phase as to what class each dataflow belongs.
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3.5.2 Attribute Sets.
There are three attribute set levels tested with each ML algorithm in this research.
The Weka ML toolkit provides two attribute reduction functions (i.e., wrapper and filter)
to find an optimal subset of attributes that yield a minimal loss of classification accuracy.
This research evaluates the full attribute set and both optimal attribute subsets produced by
the wrapper and filter functions.
Full Attribute Set. Twenty-four flow-based statistics are selected as the dataflow
attributes for this research. Each of the 24 attributes relate to one of three traffic behavior
categories: packet timing, packet size, and data throughput. The three categories are based
on the known characteristics of SCADA protocols as deterministic, hierarchical, and
consistent due to their polling nature [1, 2]. The 24 attributes make up the full attribute set
for this research.
Wrapper Attribute Subset. The wrapper function in Weka utilizes the attribute
evaluator “ClassifierSubsetEval” which creates all possible subsets from the full attribute
set [44]. A classification algorithm is specified by the experimenter which allows the
function to find an optimal subset of attributes tailored to a specific algorithm [44]. The
wrapper function provides an optimal subset of attributes that minimize the loss of
classification accuracy in comparison to the full attribute list’s TPR [44]. The wrapper
function is run with each of the four ML algorithms to reveal the optimal attribute subset.
Filter Attribute Subset. The filter function relies on the attribute evaluator
“InfoGainAttributeEval” and a ranking algorithm to evaluate and rank all 24 attributes in
the full attribute set [45]. Each attribute is assigned a rank from 1 to 24 based on its
effectiveness when performing classification. Attribute rank is assigned by the filter
function’s evaluator and ranking algorithm; the classification algorithm is not considered.
As a result, the attribute rank applies to all four ML algorithms.
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Overfitting is possible when lower-ranked attributes are eliminated prior to
classification. Overfitting in ML occurs when the trainer component creates a
classification model that is too general to accurately classify new data samples [60]. The
top five ranked attributes are selected as the filter attribute subset and the lower 19 ranked
attributes are eliminated during classification. To compensate for the possibility of
overfitting, 10-fold cross-validation is used to take advantage of all available data samples
for training and testing [49] and multiple experiment repetitions.
3.6 System Parameters
The DCS parameters include the selected ML algorithms and the individual
algorithm parameters specified within Weka. The host computer specifications can affect
the amount of time the ML algorithm’s trainer and classifier components take to build the
classification model and classify the dataset. Note that the focus of this research is the
classification accuracy of the SUT. As such, the host computer specifications are not a
parameter for this research.
The research tests four supervised ML algorithms: Naı̈ve Bayes, NBTree, BayesNet,
and J4.8 Decision Tree. The default parameters are selected in Weka for the four
algorithms consistent with previous research [28, 33, 37, 57] and pilot experiment results.
3.7 Evaluation Technique
The evaluation technique is direct measurement of the DCS classification accuracy
for each algorithm and attribute set tested. Direct measurement on the DCS is used since
the network traffic and dataflow attributes are collected from real-world SCADA and ICT
networks.
The test equipment for the experiments consists of an Ubuntu 13.04 computer, the
Weka ML toolkit (version 3.6.10), and the network traffic analysis tool Wireshark (version
1.8.2).
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The research uses TPR ( Equation (3.1)) and FPR ( Equation (3.2)) as the primary
means of evaluating and comparing learning algorithms. Supervised ML algorithms have
successfully demonstrated accuracies greater than 99% when classifying Internet
application traffic [37]; therefore, a TPR of > .99 is considered successful for the primary
research goal. Additionally, an FPR of < .05 is considered effective because it is also
important to not misclassify ICT dataflows as SCADA.
Classification model build time and dataset classification time are also reported for
each algorithm and attribute set combination in order to provide a means for evaluating
the algorithms for possible implementation into a real-world traffic classification device.
Network traffic classification should occur in near-real-time; therefore, the faster the build
and classification time of an algorithm with a given attribute set, the more feasible for use
on a real network.
3.7.1 Cross-Validation.
Performing k-fold cross-validation takes full advantage of all available data samples
for training and testing [49]. When performing k-fold cross-validation using the Weka ML
toolkit, the dataset instances are randomized and stratified, meaning each fold contains
approximately the same percentage of labels as the overall dataset [46]. Stratification
yields a less biased estimate of true accuracy [25]. The dataset is then split into k
equally-sized folds, each fold being a subset of the original dataset [47]. A total of k
rounds of learning are performed, each round utilizing a different fold of the k folds as the
testing dataset and the remaining folds for the training dataset [47]. The final averaged
accuracy from the k rounds provides a true estimate of the accuracy of the learning
algorithm on the given dataset [49].
3.7.2 10-Fold Cross-Validation.
Testing a classification model with data samples that were used during the training
phase can lead to higher classification accuracy rates than the algorithm would typically
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yield [59]. ML research is generally more concerned with how a classifier performs with
data samples it has never seen before, rather than how well it can repeat the classification
labels on the data samples used in training. To avoid this dilemma, a 10-fold
cross-validation is used to measure the classification accuracy of the four ML algorithms.
Note that common values when performing cross-validation are five or ten [49]. It has
been shown that k = 10 provides a true estimate of an algorithm’s classification
performance [59].
Figure 3.2 illustrates the first three rounds of a 10-fold cross-validation experiment
using a dataset containing two classes. In this figure the oval represents one class (i.e.,
ICT) and the diamond represents the other class (i.e., SCADA). The dataset containing all
data samples is divided into ten equally-sized folds. Each fold contains an equal number
of data samples and is stratified to ensure an equal ratio of class type for each fold. For
example, in this research there are 116,527 total data samples in the final dataset, of which
1,736 are classified as SCADA and 114,791 are classified as ICT. Therefore, when 10-fold
cross-validation is performed on the final dataset, each fold contains approximately 11,652
data samples, of which approximately 173 are classified as SCADA and 11,479 as ICT.
When performing 10-fold cross-validation, 9 folds are used for training and 1 fold is
used for testing. Using more data samples for training allows the trainer to create a more
accurate classification model [59]. When a fold is used as the testing dataset, the data
sample’s class label attribute is removed prior to providing the dataset to the classifier
component. Round one in Figure 3.2 shows fold one used as the testing dataset and folds
two through ten used as the training dataset. Round two shows fold two as the testing
dataset and the other nine folds used for the training dataset. Round three shows fold three
as the testing dataset and the other nine folds used for training. Ten rounds are conducted
to ensure each fold is used as a testing dataset; therefore, each data sample has been
classified at least once by the classifier component. The average classification accuracy
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after all 10 rounds provides the final accuracy of the selected algorithm using the given
dataset.
Figure 3.2: Three Iterations of 10-Fold Cross-Validation.
.
3.8 Experimental Design
A partial factorial design for the experiments is used in this research. Experiments
are conducted for all four ML algorithms using each of the three attribute levels: the full
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attibute set, the wrapper attribute subset, and the filter attribute subset. Each attribute set is
tested with the four algorithms for 3 * 4 = 12 experiments. Even though 10-fold
cross-validation is used for every experiment, ten repetitions of each experiment are run to
ensure a true estimate of the algorithm’s accuracy performance is achieved. With 12
unique experiments and 10 repetitions, 120 total experiments are conducted. Weka’s
10-fold cross-validation fold generator automatically creates random, stratified folds;
therefore, the entire dataset can be used for each experiment.
Figure 3.3 is an example of the steps taken in Weka to perform one full experiment
using 10-fold cross-validation and the Naı̈ve Bayes ML algorithm. It begins by loading
the ARFF file which contains the workload (mixed dataflows), then the Class Assigner
specifies which attribute contains the class type (i.e., SCADA or ICT). Next, the labeled
dataset goes to the CrossValidation FoldMaker to create the 10 folds. For each round of
the 10-fold cross-validation, 9 labeled folds are sent to the training component of the
selected supervised ML algorithm and 1 unlabeled fold is sent to the classifier component.
This portion of the experiment is conducted 10 times (10 rounds), so that each fold is used
for training and testing. The average of the 10 rounds is sent to the Classifier Performance
Evaluator, which displays the results in a Text Viewer. Figure 3.4 shows an example
output of the TextViewer after one experiment is run using 10-fold cross-validation on a
dataset.
The confusion matrix at the bottom of Figure 3.4 provides the number of TPs, TNs,
FPs, and FNs. In this example, there are a total of 1,694 TPs; 42 FNs; 114,177 TNs; and
614 FPs. Indeed, 1694 SCADA dataflows are classified accurately and 42 misclassified as
ICT for a TPR .976. Similarly, 614 misclassified as SCADA and 114,117 ICT dataflows
are classified accurately for an FPR of .005.
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Figure 3.3: Steps to Conduct One ML Experiment in Weka.
.
Figure 3.4: TextViewer Results from One ML Experiment Run in Weka.
.
3.9 Methodology Summary
This chapter examined the methodology used to test four supervised ML algorithms,
Naı̈ve Bayes, NBTree, BayesNet, and J4.8 decision tree, for identifying SCADA network
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traffic in a mixed network traffic trace. A mixed traffic dataset containing both SCADA
and ICT device dataflows is created using traffic collected from two real-world SCADA
networks and a real-world ICT network. Twenty-four flow-based attributes categorized
into one of the three traffic behavior categories: packet timing, packet size, and data
throughput, are calculated from each dataflow in the dataset. Two attribute reduction
functions are used to find optimal attribute subsets for the algorithms with minimal loss of
classification accuracy. The effectiveness of each algorithm is measured using the average
TPR and FPR after performing 10 repetitions of 10-fold cross-validation experiments.
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IV. Results and Analysis
There are two main goals for this research. The first goal is to demonstrate the ability
to identify SCADA network traffic within a mixed network traffic trace by achieving a
TPR of at least .99. Section 4.1 presents the results of each algorithm’s SCADA network
traffic identification when using the full attribute list. The second goal is to identify an
optimal subset of attributes while maintaining the .99 TPR for SCADA network traffic.
Section 4.2 presents the resulting attribute subsets from the attribute reduction functions in
Weka and their TPR and FPR when tested with each algorithm. Section 4.3 reports the
time to build the classification model and to classify the dataset for each algorithm and
attribute set level for possible implementation.
4.1 Algorithm Accuracy Analysis
The first goal is to demonstrate the ability to identify SCADA network traffic using
supervised ML algorithms given a mixed network traffic trace obtaining at least a .99
TPR. Twenty-four flow-based attributes are calculated from each dataflow in the dataset to
be used by the ML algorithm for traffic classification. Each of the four ML algorithms is
tested with the full attribute set using 10-fold cross-validation with 10 repetitions. The
TPR and FPR are used to measure the effectiveness of each ML algorithm for identifying
SCADA network traffic. TPR is the rate of accurately identified SCADA dataflows and
FPR is the rate of ICT dataflows misclassified as SCADA. TPR is calculated using
Equation (3.1) and FPR is calculated using Equation (3.2).
When using 10-fold cross-validation, each round utilizes one fold of the dataset is
used for testing and nine folds are used for training. There are a total of 10 rounds per
experiment to ensure each fold is used at least once for testing and training. Therefore, the
number of testing samples is always 1/10th the number of samples in the full dataset.
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The final dataset contains 116,527 mixed network traffic data samples, of which
approximately 104,874 are used for testing and 11,653 for training at each round. The
folds are stratified to ensure an even ratio of class type per fold. For example, there are
1,736 SCADA dataflows and 114,791 ICT dataflows in the final dataset. On average, each
of the folds used in 10-fold cross-validation contains 173 SCADA dataflows and 11,479
ICT dataflows; however, this number varies slightly since Weka generates random folds at
each round.
Table 4.1 provides the average TPR and FPR after 10 repetitions of 10-fold
cross-validation for each algorithm using the full attribute list. With a TPR of .9933,
BayesNet is the only algorithm that demonstrates the ability to classify SCADA dataflows
in a mixed traffic network with at least a .99 TPR using the full attribute set. While the
other three ML algorithms display TPRs of greater than .96, they do not meet the first
research goal. All four algorithms meet the goal of an FPR < .05 for ICT dataflows
misclassified as SCADA, with J4.8 having the lowest FPR at .0023.
Table 4.1: Algorithm Accuracies using Full Attribute Set.
Algorithm TPR FPR
Naı̈ve Bayes .9762 .0052
NBTree .975 .0026
BayesNet .9933 .0037
J4.8 .9668 .0023
4.2 Optimal Subsets of SCADA Dataflow Attributes
The second goal of this research is to find an optimal subset of attributes that
maintains at least a .99 TPR for SCADA network traffic identification. The Weka ML
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toolkit contains two attribute reduction functions (i.e., wrapper and filter) that provide an
optimal subset of attributes while minimizing loss of classification accuracy.
4.2.1 Wrapper Function Results.
The wrapper function in Weka utilizes the attribute evaluator “ClassifierSubsetEval”
which creates all possible subsets from the full attribute set [44]. A classification
algorithm is specified by the experimenter which allows the function to find an optimal
subset of attributes tailored to the specified algorithm [44]. The Weka wrapper function
derives an optimal subset of attributes from the full attribute set by discerning the
attributes that minimize the loss of classification accuracy [44]. Note that the wrapper
function does not rank the attributes in the given subset. The identified optimal wrapper
attribute subsets specific to each algorithm are:
• Naı̈ve Bayes:
13 - Minimum Ethernet frame byte size (source to destination)
14 - Maximum Ethernet frame byte size (destination to source)
15 - Mean Ethernet frame byte size (destination to source)
19 - Mean bits per second (source to destination)
23 - Mean bits per second (destination to source)
24 - Variance of bits per second (destination to source)
• NBTree:
1 - Minimum inter-packet arrival time (source to destination)
5 - Minimum inter-packet arrival time (destination to source)
6 - Maximum inter-packet arrival time (destination to source)
7 - Mean inter-packet arrival time (destination to source)
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11 - Mean Ethernet frame byte size (source to destination)
13 - Minimum Ethernet frame byte size (source to destination)
16 - Variance of Ethernet frame byte size (destination to source)
19 - Mean bits per second (source to destination)
• BayesNet:
1 - Minimum inter-packet arrival time (source to destination)
15 - Maximum Ethernet frame byte size (destination to source)
23 - Mean bits per second (destination to source)
• J4.8 Decision Tree:
1 - Minimum inter-packet arrival time (source to destination)
2 - Maximum inter-packet arrival time (source to destination)
3 - Mean inter-packet arrival time (source to destination)
4 - Variance of inter-packet arrival time (source to destination)
5 - Minimum inter-packet arrival time (destination to source)
9 - Minimum Ethernet frame byte size (source to destination)
13 - Minimum Ethernet frame byte size (source to destination)
16 - Variance of Ethernet frame byte size (destination to source)
20 - Variance of bits per second (source to destination)
23 - Mean bits per second (destination to source)
24 - Variance of bits per second (destination to source)
The list of wrapper attribute subsets is provided in Table 4.2. Note that the NBTree,
BayesNet, and J4.8 Decision Tree subsets include attributes associated with all three
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traffic behavior categories (i.e., packet timing, packet size and data throughput), whereas
the Naı̈ve Bayes subset only uses packet size and data throughput. The attributes selected
for each algorithm differ because their unique classification models require certain
attributes for classification while other attributes may be unnecessary to obtain the same
accuracy rate.
Table 4.3 provides the average TPR and FPR after 10 repetitions of 10-fold
cross-validation. Each algorithm is run using their unique optimal subset of attributes
provided by the wrapper function found in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Wrapper Attribute Subset.
Algorithm Wrapper Attribute Subset
Naı̈ve Bayes 13, 14, 15, 19, 23, 24
NBTree 1, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 16, 19
BayesNet 1, 15, 23
J4.8 Decision Tree 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 13, 16, 20, 23, 24
Table 4.3: Algorithm Accuracies using Wrapper Attribute Subset.
Algorithm TPR FPR
Naı̈ve Bayes .9838 .0041
NBTree .9805 .0025
BayesNet .9709 .0029
J4.8 .9632 .0022
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The SCADA network traffic identification results for Naı̈ve Bayes and NBTree
improve by almost .02 TPR when using the wrapper attribute subset; however, their
accuracies do not meet the goal of at least .99. BayesNet and J4.8 show a decrease in their
SCADA network traffic identification results when using the wrapper attribute subset.
BayesNet demonstrated a TPR of .9933 for SCADA network traffic identification when
using the full attribute list and only .9709 with the wrapper attribute subset, no longer
meeting the goal of at least .99. All four algorithms show a slight decrease in their FPRs,
indicating that the wrapper attribute subsets reduce the erroneous classification of ICT
dataflows as SCADA dataflows. While none of the algorithms meet the goal of at least a
.99 TPR for SCADA network traffic identification when using the wrapper attribute
subset, Naı̈ve Bayes demonstrates the highest TPR of .9838.
4.2.2 Filter Function Results.
The filter function in Weka relies on the attribute evaluator “InfoGainAttributeEval”
and a ranking algorithm to evaluate and rank all 24 attributes in the full attribute set [45].
Attribute rank is assigned by the function’s evaluator and ranker; therefore, the
classification algorithm is not considered. As such, the attribute rank applies to all four
ML algorithms. Figure 4.1 shows the output after running the filter attribute reduction
function on the mixed traffic dataset. The rank and associated percentage of information
gain for each attribute is provided in the output. The fully ranked list of attributes
provided by the filter function in order of precedence is: 1, 19, 13, 14, 18, 11, 2, 9, 20, 5,
6, 15, 17, 22, 10, 21, 23, 3, 7, 16, 24, 4, 12, 8.
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Figure 4.1: Filter Function Attribute Rank.
The top five ranked attributes chosen as the filter attribute subset for the final
experiments, shown in order of precedence, are:
• 1 - Minimum inter-packet arrival time from source to destination
• 19 - Mean bits per second from source to destination
• 13 - Minimum Ethernet frame byte size from destination to source
• 14 - Maximum Ethernet frame byte size from destination to source
• 18 - Maximum bits per second from source to destination
Note that the top five ranked attributes include attributes from all three traffic
behavior categories–packet timing, packet size, and data throughput. The filter function
ranks minimum inter-packet arrival time as the most effective attribute for classification
57
accuracy, which is associated with the packet timing category. The mean bits per second
attribute is ranked second and is associated with the data throughput category. The third
and fourth ranked attributes are associated with the packet size category and the fifth
ranked attribute is associated with data throughput. Indeed, for the given mixed traffic
dataset, packet timing is the most influential factor for identifying SCADA network traffic.
Table 4.4 provides the average TPR and FPR after 10 repetitions of 10-fold
cross-validation. Each algorithm is run using the top five ranked attributes provided by the
filter function.
Table 4.4: Algorithm Accuracies using Filter Attribute Subset.
Algorithm TPR FPR
Naı̈ve Bayes .976 .0078
NBTree .968 .0026
BayesNet .9935 .0051
J4.8 .9706 .0025
Naı̈ve Bayes and NBTree show a slight decrease in their SCADA network traffic
identification results when using the filter attribute subset compared to both the wrapper
attribute subset and full attribute set. For both algorithms, the wrapper attribute subset is
optimal as it provided the highest TPRs; however, neither algorithm met the .99 TPR goal.
J4.8 displays a slight improvement when using the filter attribute subset over both the full
attribute set (+.0038) and the wrapper attribute subset (+.0074); therefore, the filter
attribute subset is its optimal attribute subset, although J4.8 never reached the .99 accuracy
goal.
BayesNet shows a peak TPR of .9935 when using the filter attribute subset making it
an optimal subset for the algorithm. All algorithms, except NBTree, show a slight FPR
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increase in comparison to using the full attribute list. This increase indicates that
overfitting may have occurred because the filter attribute subset misclassifies more ICT
dataflows as SCADA, however, all FPRs remain under .01, which meets the goal of less
than .05.
Although Naı̈ve Bayes, NBTree, and J4.8 do not meet the .99 TPR goal, they
demonstrate SCADA network traffic identification results greater than .95 with all three
attribute set levels. Moore et al. [33], achieved a 65% accuracy for Internet traffic
classification when using Naı̈ve Bayes and a 95% accuracy after two refinement
techniques were applied; therefore, a TPR of at least .95, while not meeting the overall
research objective, is still a successful result.
Overall, BayesNet using the filter attribute subset demonstrates the highest SCADA
network traffic identification results with a TPR of .9935. Furthermore, BayesNet is the
only ML algorithm tested that meets the first goal of identifying SCADA network traffic,
obtaining at least a .99 TPR, and the second goal of finding an optimal subset of attributes
while maintaining the .99 TPR. BayesNet’s optimal attribute subset contains attributes
from all three traffic behavior categories. Additionally, the top five ranked attributes from
the filter function include attributes from all three traffic behavior categories. This
reinforces the distinction of SCADA network traffic from traditional ICT network traffic
based on packet timing, packet size, and data throughput.
4.3 Algorithm Timing Comparison
The classification model build time and dataset classification time for each algorithm
and attribute set level were also examined to provide additional performance metrics for
evaluating the algorithms for possible implementation into a real-world traffic
classification device. Table 4.5 provides the mean model build time (MBT) and dataset
classification time (DCT) results in seconds. Note that the TPR is included as a reference
for consideration when comparing algorithm performance.
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4.3.1 Model Build Time.
Table 4.5 displays the mean classification model build times for each algorithm and
attribute set level tested. The fastest model build time is underlined in the table for each
attribute set level. Naı̈ve Bayes had the fastest model build times for all three attribute set
levels: 1.327 seconds with the full attribute set, .324 seconds with the wrapper attribute
subset, and .229 seconds with the filter attribute subset. NBTree had the slowest model
build times for all three attribute set levels. Note that BayesNet, the only ML algorithm
tested that exceeded the desired .99 TPR for SCADAnetwork traffic identification, had a
mean model build time of 10.906 seconds with the full attribute list and 1.799 seconds
with the filter attribute subset.
While classification model build time provides a metric for algorithm performance, it
is only necessary to build the model once when classifying continuous datasets.
Therefore, a more important performance discriminator is the dataset classification time
when choosing an algorithm for implementation into a real-world device. Note that the
model build times improve significantly for all four algorithms when the wrapper and
filter attribute subsets are used in the experiments.
4.3.2 Dataset Classification Time.
Table 4.5 also shows the mean dataset classification times for each algorithm and
attribute set level tested. The fastest classification time is underlined in the table for each
attribute set level. Again, Naı̈ve Bayes had the fastest dataset classification times for all
three attribute set levels: 13.873 seconds with the full attribute set, 6.076 seconds with the
wrapper attribute subset, and 7.571 seconds with the filter attribute subset. Furthermore,
NBTree had the slowest dataset classification times for all three attribute set levels.
BayesNet had a dataset classification time of 68.994 seconds with the full attribute set and
17.301 with the filter attribute set.
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The dataset classification time is a more critical performance metric since it
demonstrates how quickly the algorithm can classify continuous network traffic.
Algorithms with faster dataset classification times are more feasible for implementation
into a real-world device. Similar to the model build time, the dataset classification times
improved significantly for all four algorithms when the wrapper and filter attribute subsets
are used.
4.3.3 Attribute Set Selection.
The dataflow classification results when using the full attribute list had a peak TPR of
.9933 with the BayesNet algorithm. However, BayesNet’s mean model build time was
10.906 seconds and dataset classification time was 68.994 seconds when using the full
attribute set. The accuracy results when using the filter attribute subset showed a peak
TPR of .9935 with BayesNet while its model build time dropped to 1.799 seconds and
dataset classification time to 17.301 seconds.
Note that the dataset classification times and model build times were faster for all
four algorithms for the wrapper attribute as compared to the full attribute set. The
BayesNet algorithm’s dataset classification time and model build time, however, increased
for the filter attribute subset as compared to the wrapper attribute subset. The time
increase is a result of the BayesNet wrapper subset only containing three attributes, as
compared to the five attributes in the filter attribute set; the other three algorithms
contained more than five attributes in their respective wrapper subsets. The results
demonstrate that using the filter attribute subset meets the required SCADA dataflow
classification accuracy while reducing the timing overhead of the full attribute set.
4.4 Summary
The first research goal of demonstrating the ability to identify SCADA network
traffic in a mixed network traffic trace, obtaining at least a .99 TPR, is achieved with the
BayesNet algorithm. Naı̈ve Bayes, NBTree, and J4.8 Decision Tree demonstrate SCADA
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network traffic identification results of greater than .96. While not meeting the goal of a
.99 TPR, the results offer promising indicators for using ML techniques in SCADA traffic
classification.
The second research goal of identifying an optimal subset of attributes while
maintaining at least a .99 TPR is also met with BayesNet’s peak TPR of .9935 when using
the filter attribute subset. The top five ranked attributes used as the filter attribute subset
include attributes from all three traffic behavior categories. This reinforces the distinction
of SCADA network traffic from traditional ICT network traffic based on packet timing,
packet size, and data throughput.
Notional evaluation is performed on the classification model build and dataset
classification times for each algorithm and attribute set level. Naı̈ve Bayes demonstrated
the fastest classification model build times for all three attribute set levels, with mean
times of .229 seconds with the filter attribute subset and .324 seconds with the wrapper
attribute subset. Naı̈ve Bayes also had the fastest dataset classification times for all three
attribute set levels, with mean times of 6.076 seconds with the filter attribute subset and
7.571 seconds with the wrapper attribute subset. The model build times and dataset
classification times improved significantly when the wrapper and filter subsets were used
with all four ML algorithms.
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V. Conclusions
This chapter summarizes the results of the research. Section 5.1 discusses the
conclusions based on the results in Chapter 4. Section 5.2 lists the contributions of the
research, and Section 5.3 describes recommendations for future work.
5.1 Conclusions
Four supervised ML algorithms are tested on their ability to classify SCADA device
dataflows within a mixed traffic network: Naı̈ve Bayes, NBTree, BayesNet, and J4.8
Decision Tree. The mixed traffic trace used to test the four algorithms is generated using
traces collected from real-world SCADA and traditional ICT networks. Twenty-four
attributes based on packet timing, packet size, and data throughput are calculated from
each dataflow in the mixed traffic trace.
Each algorithm is tested using three attribute set levels: the full attribute set, the
wrapper function subset, and the filter function subset. The first goal of the research was
to demonstrate that a TPR of at least .99 is feasible for identifying SCADA network traffic
within a mixed network traffic trace; therefore, an algorithm is considered effective if it
has a TPR of at least .99. It is also important to not misclassify ICT dataflows as SCADA;
therefore, an FPR of < .05 is desirable. The second goal was to find an optimal subset of
attributes that maintain the .99 TPR for SCADA network traffic identification. BayesNet,
when using the full attribute set and the filter attribute subset, achieved the goal with TPRs
of .9933 and .9935, respectively. Furthermore, BayesNet’s FPR was less than .01 when
using both attributes sets. Therefore, both research goals were achieved with BayesNet
using the filter attribute subset.
The top five ranked attributes used as the filter attribute subset included attributes
from all three traffic behavior categories. This reinforced the distinct behaviors of SCADA
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network traffic from ICT network traffic based on packet timing, packet size, and data
throughput.
5.2 Contributions
The research presented four supervised ML algorithms for use in identifying SCADA
network traffic in a mixed network traffic trace, and demonstrated that ML algorithms can
achieve an acceptable TPR in this context. It also presented two optimal attribute subsets
for identifying SCADA network traffic.
This research also analyzed the time to build the classification model and to classify
the dataset for each algorithm using the full list of 24 flow-based attributes and the two
optimal attribute subsets. As mixed traffic networks in the corporate environment become
more commonplace, the ability to differentiate between SCADA network traffic and
traditional ICT network traffic is critical to security [11, 48].
This work furthers the current research in the field by contributing the proven
capability to identify SCADA network traffic using an optimal subset of flow-based
attributes and ML techniques to achieve > .99 TPR for a given network. To date, using
ML algorithms and flow-based attributes is a novel approach for SCADA network traffic
identification. Typical traffic classification techniques have used packet information such
as port, protocol, IP address and payload content to classify network traffic (e.g., [9, 56]).
The ability to identify a SCADA device on a mixed traffic network without prior
knowledge of protocol, port, or IP address is necessary as SCADA devices tend to use
proprietary protocols and non-standard ports. Instances, such as when Google’s building
management system (BMS) was accessed and administrator password retrieved from the
Internet [42], reveal that many times asset owners are not only unaware that SCADA
devices are on their networks but these devices are also connected to the Internet. As
mixed traffic networks in the corporate environment become more commonplace, the
ability to identify SCADA device traffic using traditional means such as port, protocol and
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IP address, as well as non-traditional means such as flow-based statistics, is
necessary [11].
5.3 Future Work
The items listed below are suggestions for future work that could expand on the
research presented here.
• Use SCADA and Traditional ICT Device Types as Labels
This research only classified dataflows as originating from either a SCADA or ICT
device. The dataset created for this research contained dataflows from two SCADA
facilities and a variety of traditional ICT devices. Classifying or labeling dataflows
based on the type of device (i.e., PLC, building automation system (BAS), mail
server, or print server) could provide further insight into those specific device
dataflow behaviors or signatures.
• Test Algorithms On Different Network Traffic
As discussed in Chapter 3, performance is expected to change for different
networks. Extending this research to other ICT and SCADA network traffic traces
provides further insight into classification and may help further refine results.
• Test Accuracy Stability Over Time
While SCADA networks tend to have a static topology, traditional ICT network
topologies change drastically over time as devices are constantly added and
removed. This research is intended for mixed traffic networks, where the topology is
dynamic. By creating datasets from the same three networks used in this research
with traces taken at a later date, the classification accuracy of the algorithms can
re-examined. By using the classification models created during this research on the
new datasets, it can be determined whether the classifiers require updating over time.
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• Use New Flow-Based Statistics
The 24 flow-based statistical attributes yielded acceptable classification accuracy
results; however, the optimal subset of attributes for this dataset found packet timing
to be the most influential traffic behavior category for distinguishing SCADA traffic
dataflows. Further research exploring this behavior and testing other attribute
categories may achieve higher classification accuracies.
• Use Different Supervised ML Algorithms
This research used four supervised ML algorithms. The algorithms were chosen
based on previous research success for traffic classification problems. There are
numerous supervised ML algorithms available in Weka that may yield higher
classification accuracies.
• Test With Various Dataflow Mixes
This research used a dataset which contained 116,527 mixed dataflows. Of those,
only 1,736 dataflows were SCADA dataflows, while the other 114,791 were
traditional ICT dataflows. This mixture is intended to represent a typical mixed
traffic network with significantly more traditional device traffic than SCADA
device. Classification accuracy results may vary depending on the dataflow mixture
within the dataset. Testing the algorithms with various dataflow mixtures may yield
different classification accuracy results.
• Implement On A Real-World Mixed Network
This research demonstrated that SCADA dataflow classification is feasible using
ML with a mixed traffic trace created from real-world network traffic. The next
phase of this research includes extending the implementation to an operational,
real-time network.
67
5.4 Summary
SCADA devices are being connected to corporate networks to provide remote control
and monitoring, usage reporting and automated billing capabilities. As such, network
traffic classification techniques specific to SCADA device traffic are necessary. This
research presents a novel technique of utilizing supervised ML algorithms and flow-based
statistics to accurately classify SCADA traffic in a mixed traffic network. By utilizing this
technique, SCADA devices can be identified without prior knowledge of port, protocol, IP
address or payload content information.
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